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Many studies imply causal links between linguistic competencies and Theory of Mind
(ToM). But despite Dyslexia being a prime example of linguistic deficits, studies on
whether it is related to ToM have been relatively unforthcoming. In the first of 2
studies (N = 89), independently-diagnosed dyslexic adults and non-dyslexic adults
were presented with false-belief vignettes via computer, answering 4 types of question
(Factual, Inference, 1st-order ToM & 2nd-order ToM). Dyslexia related to lower false-belief
scores. Study 2 (N = 93) replicated this result with a non-computer-based variant
on the false-belief task. We considered the possibility that the apparent-issue with
ToM is caused by processing demands more associated to domains of cognition
such as language, than to ToM itself. Addressing this possibility, study 2 additionally
utilised the ToM30Q questionnaire, designed largely to circumvent issues related to
language and memory. Principal-Components analysis extracted 4 factors, 2 capturing
perceptual/representational ToM, and the other 2 capturing affective components related
to ToM. The ToM30Q was validated via its associations to a published measure of
empathy, replication of the female gender advantage over males, and for one factor from
the ToM30Q there was a correlation with an existing published index of ToM. However,
when we considered the performance of dyslexic and non-dyslexic participants using
the ToM30Q, we found absolutely no difference between them. The contrasting findings
from our 2 studies here, arguably offer the first experimental evidence with adults, that
there is in fact no ToM deficit in dyslexia. Additionally, this finding raises the possibility that
some other groups considered in some sense atypical, failed ToM tasks, not because
they actually have a ToM deficit at all, but rather because they are asked to reveal their
ToM competence through cognitive domains, such as language and memory.
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INTRODUCTION
Theory ofMind (ToM) is the socio-cognitive ability to theorise about themind as typically the cause
and sometimes the target of behaviour, and the related cognitive ability to take another person’s
subjective perspective irrespective of whether the reasoner holds that perspective him/herself
(Moran, 2013; Abdel-Hamid et al., 2019; cf. Premack and Dasser, 1991; Tompkins et al., 2013).
ToM seems an important factor in social phenomena such as empathy,moral reasoning and conflict
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resolution (Bruneau and Saxe, 2012; Dodell-Feder et al.,
2013; Gonzalez-Liencres et al., 2013). This may be partly
why psychological disorders such as autism, bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, personality disorder, sensory and learning
disabilities, and dementia have each been found to be associated
with issues in the functioning of ToM (Gregory et al., 2002; Wolf
et al., 2010; Hobson, 2014; de Vaan et al., 2018; Németh et al.,
2018; Acosta et al., 2019).
Many experimental tasks for assessing ToM ultimately derive
from the form of a “false-belief task” devised by Wimmer and
Perner (1983). In this simple yet ingenious task, the reasoner
must give a response indicating s/he understands that a person’s
behaviour is based on that person’s subjective perception, as
distinct from the reasoner’s own current factual knowledge of
the situation (Premack and Dasser, 1991; Lillard, 2015). Hence,
such tasks tend to be termed tasks of false-belief (Wellman et al.,
2001; cf. Wimmer and Perner, 1983). There are parallel profiles of
ToMdevelopment across Eastern andWestern cultures, however,
the age at which a particular culture passes on false-belief tasks
can vary by as much as 2 years (Naito, 2003). This finding was
robustly confirmed in a meta-analytic comparison between 196
studies carried out in China and 155 studies carried out in the
US (Liu et al., 2008). And this may impact on our ability to make
precise comparisons across diverse groups when relying only on
false-belief tasks.
Wellman (2018) provides an integrative account of how this
“first-order” false-belief ToM ability finds its origins in more
basic perceptual and social competencies, which facilitate its
emergence and development during the child’s first 5 years.
However, “second-order” tasks demonstrate that ToM typically
undergoes up to 2more years of development before it can be said
to be of similar basic maturity to ToM in adults. In second-order
ToM, the reasoner contemplates the differing subjective beliefs of
two protagonists in addition to his/her own current belief about
a situation (Perner, 1991; Slade and Ruffman, 2005). Such higher
order ToM requires appreciation and coordination of a greater
number of symbolic representations and hence they highlight the
importance of memory (Abell et al., 2000; Kaland et al., 2005;
McKinnon and Moscovitch, 2007; Wright and Mahfoud, 2014).
The often reported finding that first- and second-order ToM
are well-developed by middle childhood, could be taken to imply
that adolescents and adults would perform too near ceiling for
ToM tasks to be useful measures of their understandings of
mind (Dodell-Feder et al., 2013). On this issue, it has been
shown that if the social context of ToM reasoning is made
highly relevant to situations adults might find themselves in, then
second-order ToM in particular may be below ceiling even for
adults (Hedden and Zhand, 2002; Keysar et al., 2003; Terwogt
and Rieffe, 2003; McKinnon and Moscovitch, 2007; Im-Bolter
et al., 2016). In Rutherford’s (2004) task using false-belief stories,
adults answered questions that involved differing beliefs of up
to four protagonists (4th-order false-belief). Thus, this may have
impacted on memory in addition to ToM reasoning.
Cognitive domains such as memory, executive functions and
language have been confirmed to be important in ToM (Carlson
and Moses, 2001; Kaland et al., 2005; Gokcen et al., 2009; Moran,
2013; Baker et al., 2014; Mary et al., 2016; Demetrious and
Spanoudis, 2018). Arguably, the most important cognitive factor
may be linguistic-processing (Jackson, 2001; cf. Miller, 2001;
Cardillo et al., 2018; Conte et al., 2019; Bailey and Im-Bolter,
2020; Ebert, 2020; Sarmento-Henrique et al., 2020). In support
of this notion, Bailey and Im-Bolter (2020) report that having
epilepsy in childhood has a highly detrimental effect on ToM.
Also, blind children, who tend to have an atypical language
developmental trajectory in early childhood, acquire ToM some
5 years later than deaf children, who in turn acquire ToM around
2 years later than typically-developing children (Hobson, 2014;
Russell et al., 1998; Peterson et al., 2000; Roch-Levecq, 2006).
Given such findings regarding language and ToM in various
atypical groups, we wondered about the extent to which this
might generalise such that ToM performance will be impacted
by any language-related developmental issue that continues into
adulthood (Fahie and Symons, 2003; Kerr et al., 2003; Kaland
et al., 2005; Dodell-Feder et al., 2013; Bailey and Im-Bolter, 2020).
In line with this notion, language measures taken early
in childhood do tend to predict ToM performance in later
childhood, much more strongly than the converse (Milligan
et al., 2007). de Villiers and Pyers (2002), reported that the
crucial variable for passing ToM tasks is the child’s possession of
more complex syntactic constructions; which have been linked
to other aspects of language such as inflectional morphology,
comprehension and potentially even size of vocabulary (Watson
et al., 2001; Mills and Fox, 2016). Thus, notwithstanding effects of
memory, language may be in some sense integral to ToM or even
a prerequisite to it (cf. Astington and Jenkins, 1999; Miller, 2001;
Bailey and Im-Bolter, 2020). On this language-facilitatory thesis,
Bloom and German (2000) accept that if linguistic resources are
in some way under-developed or compromised, this could cause
failures on false-belief tasks of ToM.
However, although consistent with the idea that ToM may
be predicated on language, Bloom and German’s theory seems
also to contemplate an alternative possible relationship: That
is, language may only seem related to false-belief indexes of
ToM, because we tend to test ToM using language-related
protocols (e.g., syntax, vocabulary and even memory for words
and spellings— Watson et al., 2001; de Villiers and Pyers, 2002;
Slade and Ruffman, 2005; Mills and Fox, 2016). It may be that
the more we require participants to rely on multiple symbolic
representations or to have to comprehend and respond via
linguistic constructions (which although perfectly grammatical
may be untypical of spontaneous real world socio-cognitive
interactions regarding minds), the more our participants are
made to engage memory and linguistic competencies in order to
tell us how they have reasoned aboutminds. If linguistic processes
are impacted in some way, this may result in language becoming
something of a barrier or obstacle to the reasoner demonstrating
his/her well-developed ToM. Conversely, if we in some sense
reduce the need for testing through language we might observe
higher ToM performance (Bloom and German, 2000; Milligan
et al., 2007; Guajardo and Cartwright, 2016).
This disadvantage (or advantage) does not have to have
occurred because of atypical (or typical) linguistic development.
For example, Gundel and Johnson, 2013 found that typically-
developing 3 year-olds observed in their home environment
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demonstrate spontaneous production of sentences encapsulating
ToM, even though this age group tends to fail on more formal
“tests” of ToM such as via false-belief (Wellman et al., 2001;
Wright and Mahfoud, 2014). Along somewhat similar lines,
a deaf sub-group of children having a linguistic advantage
over a second sub-group (e.g., bilingual vs. monolingual or
early bilingual signers vs. late bilingual signers) tends to as a
consequence demonstrate higher ToM abilities on false-belief
tasks (Meristo et al., 2007).
To test between these two possibilities about ToM, one
should be able to compare the ToM performance of any
group experiencing significant general or specific linguistic-
diversity and a second group having no such diversity. As
well as allowing us to test between the linguistic-facilitatory
view and the language-obscuring view of ToM, the inclusion
of an appropriate language-atypical group might allow us
to go even further, and test the very validity of false-
belief tasks as traditionally the main tool for assessing ToM
itself (Bloom and German, 2000).
On this pursuit, it is perhaps surprising to note that one
salient and widely investigated developmental language disorder
is conspicuous by its near-complete absence in ToM research.
That disorder is dyslexia. Dyslexia is traditionally defined as a
specific reading disability that is not obviously explainable by
sensory impairments, general IQ or age (Jeffries and Everatt,
2004; Valdois et al., 2004; Di Filippo et al., 2008; Nandakumar
and Leat, 2008; Kalyvioti and Mikropoulos, 2012). It often
involves a greater deficit in spelling than in single-word reading
or sentence-reading (Selikowitz, 1998; Cappelli et al., 2018).
Dyslexia is also closely related to Working Memory (WM), and
differences in memory can also go some way to accounting
for the differing profiles of spelling (Jeffries and Everatt, 2004;
Brandenbury, 2015).
As well as reading, spelling and WM, dyslexia has recently
been linked to a range of other aspects of cognition. For example,
it has been linked to slower speed of processing and some deficit
in production and understanding of humour and pragmatics
(Pickering, 2006; Nicolson and Fawcett, 2008; Abd Ghani and
Gathercole, 2013; Cappelli et al., 2018; Reis et al., 2020). Although
it usually emerges fairly early in childhood, dyslexia continues to
pose challenges in early adulthood and beyond, although some
of these may decrease slightly with age (Reis et al., 2020). For
instance, Abd Ghani and Gathercole (2013) have reported that
it relates to college students’ tendency towards lower academic
study skills, more difficulty with time management and increased
anxiety about academic performance.
Granted, some evidence seems to suggest the possibility that
ToM might indeed be a factor in dyslexia (Cardillo et al.,
2018). Nilsson and de Lopez (2016) found that specific language
impairment (SLI), which is often taken to be similar to dyslexia,
is associated with a lower ToM. More direct evidence comes
from Cardillo et al. (2018). They found that children having
dyslexia tended to achieve lower scores on verbally-given ToM
tasks than did children not having dyslexia. However, although
similar results have been obtained for young adults on pragmatic
reasoning tasks (Griffiths, 2007), this finding seems yet to be
replicated in ToM with an adult group having dyslexia.
Summary of Aims and Predictions
It can be theorised that ToM might be affected by having
dyslexia for two main reasons. First, it is an example of an
aspect of language which might be regarded as atypical (Jeffries
and Everatt, 2004; Cappelli et al., 2018). Second, if the view
that language is a facilitator of ToM or even integral to it
is correct, then linguistic deficits related to the accessing of-,
representation of-, and maintenance of symbolic information,
or the manipulation and moving between multiple linguistic
forms (e.g., the representation of a past view whilst similarly
representing a current view), may lead to genuine deficits in ToM.
But in order to test the reality of this possible ToM deficit, it
may be necessary to employ alternative tasks in addition to only
using false-belief.
The present research therefore had three main aims which
we addressed across two studies. Firstly, to provide an initial
test of the language facilitating hypothesis of ToM against the
language-obscuring hypothesis we considered above. This aim
was approached by comparing a group having dyslexia to a group
having no such diagnosis. We predicted that, because of the
language and memory demands of the standard false-belief task,
adults having dyslexia should perform less well both on first-
order and second-order ToM questions than a comparison group
not having dyslexia, and this finding should hold across two
different variants on the false-belief task.
Secondly, we aimed to introduce an alternative way of
approaching the issue of ToM measurement, that avoided as far
as practicable, issues of memory, the need to set up and maintain
multiple mental representations, and assessment of competencies
known to be related to language. Such factors might distort
measurement of the target ToM ability. The new tool introduced
here assessed ToM not by measuring false-belief in terms of test
scores, but rather by ascertaining self-reports about the extent to
which the participants align with a variety of statements designed
to be related to a number of known corollaries of ToM (e.g., own
prior-belief, others’ false-beliefs, interest in other minds. . . ). If
dyslexia really did involve a ToM deficit, we would have expected
to find essentially the same results as in aim 1 (above).
Finally, we wanted our findings to speak to the possibility that
variants on the standard false-belief task when applied to adults,
may sometimes not necessarily accurately reflect the reasoner’s
true ToM competencies. Dyslexia being a case-in-point.
STUDY 1
To address our first aim we designed a study which presented
diagnosed dyslexic participants and non-dyslexic participants
with a series of social situations told by way of short stories
(vignettes) and given via written text (Tompkins et al., 2013).
The vignettes were of a form used in much ToM research (e.g.,
McKinnon andMoscovitch, 2007) and were structuredmuch like
the stories in the Wimmer and Perner (1983) task, apart from
involving situations more relevant to adults (Hedden and Zhand,
2002; Terwogt and Rieffe, 2003).
To confirm dyslexia in the dyslexic group and also to confirm
no dyslexia for the control group, we additidonally took our own
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indices of single word reading accuracy, spelling aloud accuracy
(based on theWechsler Objective ReadingDimensions—WORD,
Rust et al., 1993), and a basicmeasure ofWMexpected to be fairly
independent of linguistic ability (based on a task used by Jeffries
and Everatt, 2004).
Method for Study 1
Participants
A total of 90 young adults studying at a UK university were
assigned to one of two groups based on two main criteria.
The first was a self-report of dyslexia. The second was having
previously been diagnosed as having dyslexia. Diagnoses of the
dyslexic group was made by professional dyslexia staff in the
university student support service, with most participants having
already reported a dyslexia diagnosis whilst in pre-HE education.
This group was recruited on the basis of presence of dyslexia
whilst having no other more pervasive language impairment
on their support profile (i.e., no participants had been given a
SLI/DLD diagnosis). Each participant in this group was also in
receipt of student support on the basis of having dyslexia. This is
an acceptable way of assigning participants to a dyslexia vs. non-
dyslexia group (e.g., see meta-analysis of 178 studies by Reis et al.,
2020). Indeed, only a single participant in the dyslexic group was
removed because being < 1.5 SDs below the mean of the group
not having dyslexia.
The resultant dyslexic group comprised 33 participants (Mean
= 23.637 years, SD = 5.093), 22 of whom were female. The non-
dyslexic group comprised 56 participants (Mean = 23.190 years,
SD= 4.904), 35 of whom were female. The resultant total sample
included in analyses was 89 participants.
Materials
An IBM compatible portable computer with a 2.4GHz PentiumM
processor ran programs for administering the dyslexia-diagnostic
tasks (i.e., reading, spelling and WM tasks) plus the critical ToM
task. A second monitor was attached and responses were taken
using two external devices connected to the computer. When
a response was entered, the responses were immediately saved
to memory.
The ToM task comprised five stories each of which outlined
a particular social scenario (hereafter termed vignettes), each
immediately followed by a series of eight questions in pseudo-
random order (i.e., pre-randomised). The vignettes were titled
Going Swimming, A Bag of Crisps, Which Shoes, Going Out
and Whose Essay. The vignette “Going Out” is presented in
Appendix 1, along with the corresponding questions and their
categories. Full transcripts of the other vignettes are available
from the first author upon reasonable request. The vignette
“Going Out” involved a situation where all the characters’ beliefs
about what has happened are incorrect but one of these actually
coincides with the current state of the world. In this vignette,
three friends decide to take a break from dancing to have a drink.
The main character buys two drinks with blackcurrant in them
for his two friends, and a drink with coke in it for himself (he
does not like blackcurrant). However, he inadvertently puts the
wrong drink by his own place at the table. Then, whilst he is
away for a moment, the second of the three friends swaps his
own drink with the main character’s drink. A factual question
could ask about why the friends needed the drinks (answer =
because they had done toomuch dancing). An inference question
might ask which drink was bought for one of the main characters
two friends (answer = we are only told that he buys three drinks
but one is with coke because he does not like blackcurrant, so
we can work the answer out inferentially). A first-order question
might be about which drink the second friend will taste (answer
= after switching the drinks, he believes he has the one with coke
in front of him but actually his original belief was false so he has
a different drink to that he thought). A second-order question
might be about which drink the second friend thinks the first
character believes he himself is about to drink (answer= only the
participant and the first character have a true belief although for
different reasons; and the second friend believes he has caused a
false-belief in the main character but that is not actually correct).
Factual questions were about information directly intimated
or explicitly stated in the vignette. Inference questions concerned
deducible or social-contextual information that did not
necessitate mentalizing. First-order questions concerned a
character’s belief/knowledge of a situation, which represented
a currently untrue state of the world. Second-order questions
concerned the participant’s understanding of what the first
character believes the second character believes about a situation
(Duval et al., 2011).
The reason for using five vignettes was to help reduce possible
fatigue effects by using vignettes that were very different from
all the others. This also reduced possible practise/carryover
effects, because we could limit the number of questions on
each vignette to eight (two for each question type). The
present data were collected and summarised automatically to
give us the four categories of the ToM-related index (Factual,
Inferential, 1st-order & 2nd-order), which meant we had not
categorised according to total scores on each vignette. However,
we computed a reliability estimate from a separate dataset (N
= 68), which had been summarised according to vignette. The
Cronbach’s Alpha reliability estimate for this separate computer
false-belief task was 0.937, which we considered high.
The reading task was a computer-presented variant of the
reading scale of theWechsler Objective Reading Dimensions also
known as the WORD (Rust et al., 1993). This presented a total
of 55 words one at a time, with these becoming progressively
more challenging to pronounce correctly. The spelling task was
a computer-presented variant of the Spelling Dimension of the
same test. This presented the researcher with a total of 50 words
plus examples of their uses in sentential contexts, which were
read out for the participant to spell aloud. Both these tasks have
been standardised with normally-developing individuals aged
between 6 and 18 years, as well as individuals with reading
and/or spelling issues (Rust et al., 1993). Thus, although the non-
dyslexic participants might approach ceiling, these tests should
still discriminate between dyslexic and non-dyslexic participants,
and between the more and less proficient readers/spellers in the
non-dyslexic group.
The primary reason for including the single-word-reading,
spelling and WM tasks was to inform us about how participants’
self-reported dyslexia status related to these aspects of cognition
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(Jeffries and Everatt, 2004; Kalyvioti and Mikropoulos, 2012).
The WM task was devised to be suited for testing participants
down to 5 years, so that future studies might contrast adults
with young children. A monitor faced the experimenter and gave
instructions for what should be presented to the participant.
The experimenter read aloud a short list of previously randomly
selected digits without placing any greater stress on any particular
digit. For each trial, the participant waited until the list was
presented and the experimenter had asked for one item from that
list. The request was either for the “biggest” or the “smallest”
digit (determined on a pre-randomised basis). The participant
was instructed to give his/her response as quickly as possible,
and only the first response was taken. This task necessitates
the participant keeping the list in mind (storage aspect) and
making the most basic decision about the digits in the list (mental
manipulation aspect).
Design
A mixed factorial design was employed, both regarding reading,
spelling and WM, and also regarding the four types of question
from the ToM task. In each case the DV was the relevant score
(e.g., reading score). For each analysis, performance was analysed
as a function of group (dyslexic vs. non-dyslexic), with this
dyslexia-status variable constituting the main IV.
Procedure
Participants were tested in a laboratory setting. The second
keyboard and monitor meant that the researcher could always
see the screen and start/stop the computer, and the participant
had a screen which could be turned off at the appropriate times.
Each participant was given the spelling task first, followed by
the WM task, reading task and finally the ToM task. For the
spelling task, the participant’s monitor was switched off. In slight
variation from the procedure presented by Rust et al. (1993) the
experimenter first read out a sentence that included the word to
be spelt, and then stated a single word which the participant then
had to spell out aloud. All responses were audio-recorded with
each participant’s prior consent (McKinnon and Moscovitch,
2007). This permitted responses to be verified later on without
delaying the test procedure.
For the WM task, the participant’s display was again switched
off. After being briefed on the task, the participant was given two
examples without the computer, in which the researcher used
a monotone voice to say a random series of numbers plus the
prompt “biggest” or “smallest.” When the participant answered,
the researcher verified it. The computer was then used to present
two formal practise trials, with the participant prompted to give
the answer as soon as s/he thought s/he knew what it was.
Although these and other trials used digits selected earlier on
a random basis, their identities and orders were now fixed. No
participant had difficulty with practise trials. The 12 experimental
trials were then given. These had an equal number of lists with
three digits, four digits and five digits. After each trial, the
researcher pressed a key to record whether the answer given had
been that on the display; and then pressed a designated key to
move to the next list of digits.
In the reading task, participants fixated a dot centrally on
their display, and then the researcher pressed a designated
key to replace the dot with the first to-be-read word. The
participant read the word aloud and was then permitted to
correct him/herself if s/he wished. Again correct responses were
indicated by the experimenter pressing a designated key, followed
by a second key to tell the computer to remove the current word
and present the next word. A delay was built into the onset of
each new word, which varied randomly between 1 and 2 s.
In the final section of the procedure, participants sat the ToM
task. This task took the form of five blocks, one vignette per
block, with each block followed by a series of eight questions.
Participants read each vignette twice, to ensure they had correctly
understood and remembered all the details (Schenkel et al., 2005;
Russell et al., 2006).
For the first pass, the participant read the vignette silently to
him/herself (Tompkins et al., 2013). This was intended to help
reduce anxiety, particularly for participants who might be feeling
more self-conscious about their reading.
Immediately upon finishing the currently displayed text on
screen, the participant pressed the space bar. This removed the
current screen. When ready, the participant pressed the space
bar again to display the next screen of text. This was intended
to help participants progress through the vignette at their own
pace; whilst simultaneously permitting us to accurately measure
the time needed to read each screen, without these times being
distorted by the lengths of breaks each participant required before
moving on. Please note, the reading-time data were analysed in
detail and will be reported elsewhere, in order to avoid detracting
from the main purpose of the present paper, and in order
to be fully consistent with study 2, which would not require
reading time data. However, we confirm that reading times were
consistent with the group membership.
After an entire vignette had been read through once, the
participant was given a break, the length of which was self
determined. The vignette was then presented again in the same
way as before, but this time the participant was asked to read each
sentence out aloud. This allowed us to verify that the information
was being read accurately; provided one condition ordering to
be used elsewhere in comparisons of reading times for silent vs.
reading aloud; and also helped ensure that participants had the
entire vignette in mind before answering any ToM questions.
Finally here, the fact that participants had already read the entire
vignette through once, served to reduce any anxieties about
reading aloud (Abd Ghani and Gathercole, 2013).
After a given vignette had been read twice, the test questions
appeared on screen one at a time. Each question was requested
via the participant pressing the spacebar. The participant read
the question aloud and then answered it as soon as they felt
able. The researcher had training and practise in efficiently
pressing a designated key on the second keyboard as soon as
the participant had pronounced the last word in the sentence,
and then pressed a different key as soon as the participant
began their answer. This allowed her to start and stop the
computer’s millisecond timer, respectively. Once the timer had
been stopped, the researcher pressed a different key to signal
whether the participant’s response had been correct, according
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to an answer sheet containing acceptable answers, which was
in front of her but conveniently placed out of sight of the
participant. For reasons explained above, only the response-
accuracy data are presented here. The entire procedure took
around 45min, excluding briefing and debriefing. Participants
were thanked for their assistance and any questions they had at
this time were answered.
Results and Discussion for Study 1
For the ToM task, participants answered a total of 40 questions
across five different vignettes. The questions were classified
into four different question-types, factual, inference, first-order
and second-order. There were two questions of each type per
vignette. Across all five vignettes, the maximum number of
correct responses for each question-type was 10.
Before considering the ToM data in detail, we considered the
make-up of the dyslexic and non-dyslexic groups, respectively.
The first indices were the tests of reading, spelling and WM.
As these tests had different maximum scores (55, 50, and 12,
respectively) we converted each score into a percentage for more
ready comparisons (please see Appendix 2 for raw scores). The
mean scores as percentages are given in Table 1 according to
dyslexia-status and cognitive task.
Table 1 shows the spelling test tended to be more demanding
than reading, with WM slightly easier than reading. It also shows
a tendency for the combined average score to be almost 10%
higher for the non-dyslexic group compared to the dyslexic
group. A three-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with gender,
dyslexia-status and cognitive-task as factors, confirmed that the
difference between the three diagnostic indices was statistically
significant [F(2, 170) = 54.146, p < 0.001, Partial Eta
2
= 0.389,
Obs.Power = 1.000]. Of note, the overall difference between our
two groups was also significant [F(1, 85) = 58.308, p < 0.001,
Partial Eta2 = 0.407, Obs.Power= 1.000].
There was a 12.7% difference between the dyslexic and non-
dyslexic group for spelling, reducing to 8.5% for reading and a
slightly lower 8.3% for WM. This profile is in line with Reis’s
et al. (2020) analyses which showedWM is typically less impacted
than spelling and reading. However, here, the suggested two-way
interaction between dyslexia-status and cognitive-task was not
statistically-significant [F(2, 170) < 1].
There was no statistically-significant overall difference
according to gender as a main effect nor of gender with either
dyslexia-status or cognitive task (each F < 1). The three-way
interaction between gender, dyslexia-status and cognitive task
was also not statistically-significant [F(2, 170) = 1.818, p = 0.166,
Partial Eta2 = 0.021, Obs.Power= 0.376].
Having confirmed our self identified dyslexic participants did
show a dyslexia profile across reading, spelling and WM (Duval
et al., 2011), we move on to the ToM analyses with the knowledge
that our two groups may be considered indeed dyslexic and
non-dyslexic, respectively. Table 2 summarises the mean scores
obtained by the two respective groups for each of the four
different types of questions on the ToM task—factual, inference,
first-order and second-order.
Table 2 shows our two groups evidenced very similar
performance on factual questions. So, they had each retained the
information in memory well. The relatively marked difference
between the groups on ToM questions (Table 2), would therefore
seem not to have resulted from differential retention of vignettes
in any straightforward way.
Average performance was lower for the dyslexic group.
Table 2 also shows a tendency for factual questions to attract
the highest scores, followed by inference questions. First-order
questions showed lower scores than inferential questions, with
second-order questions hardest of all. This profile was interesting
given that we had ensured the inference questions were of the
same form as used for the first-order ToM questions around 50%
of the time, and the same form as the second-order questions the
rest of the time.
We analysed these trends using a three-way ANOVA, having
factors of dyslexia-status, question-type and gender. The main
effect of dyslexia-status was statistically significant [F(1, 85) =
22.664, p < 0.001, Partial Eta2 = 0.210, Obs.Power= 0.997]. The
overall difference between the question-types was also statistically




Paired-contrasts showed that the higher performance on
factual questions compared to first-order ToM was statistically
significant (p < 0.001). However, the slender advantage of
first-order ToM compared to inference was not statistically
significant (p = 0.233). The higher performance of first-
order ToM compared to second-order ToM was statistically
significant (p= 0.001).
The dyslexic group’s profile from question-type to question-
type differed significantly from that of the non-dyslexic group
[two-way interaction—F(3, 255) = 3.639, p = 0.013, Partial Eta
2
= 0.041, Obs.Power = 0.794]. From Table 2 we observe that
the difference between groups was smallest for the factual
question, which did not necessitate inferential processing or
thinking in terms of minds. However, as question-type required
processing of the mental states of one and then more than one
protagonist’s subjective viewpoint, the difference between our
two groups diverged.
Neither gender as a main effect nor the two-way or three-way
interactions involving gender were statistically-significant. The
two-way interaction between gender and question-type had an
F > 1 but was not significant [F(3, 255) = 2.134, p= 0.096, Partial
Eta2 = 0.024, Obs.Power = 0.540]. All remaining interactions
with gender were also non-statistically-significant (each F < 1).
STUDY 2
Let us initially take the findings of Study 1 at face value. This
invites the interpretation that dyslexia is related to a deficit in
ToM (Abd Ghani and Gathercole, 2013; Cappelli et al., 2018;
Cardillo et al., 2018). However, now consider our thesis that
false-belief tasks require the reasoner to represent the social
situation of the protagonist in mind over time, in addition
to representing the reasoner’s current understanding of the
situation. This requires the ability to set up mental tokens for
things in the real world; what Lillard and Kavanaugh (2014) call
a symbolic representational capacity (see also Abell et al., 2000).
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TABLE 1 | Summary of tests of spelling, WM, and reading as percentages (Study 1).
Spelling WM Reading Overall
Non-Dyslexic Female 86.659 (1.386) 94.762 (1.816) 92.727 (0.848) 91.383 (0.946)
Non-Dyslexic Male 82.635 (1.790) 93.254 (2.344) 93.680 (1.095) 89.856 (1.221)
Dyslexic Female 71.628 (1.749) 84.849 (2.290) 86.281 (1.069) 80.919 (1.193)
Dyslexic Male 72.364 (2.473) 86.364 (3.239) 83.140 (1.512) 80.623 (1.687)
Non-Dyslexic 84.647 (1.132) 94.008 (1.482) 93.203 (0.692) 90.619 (0.772)
Dyslexic 71.996 (1.514) 85.606 (1.983) 84.711 (0.926) 80.771 (1.033)
Female 79.143 (1.116) 89.805 (1.461) 89.504 (0.682) 86.151 (0.761)
Male 77.499 (1.526) 89.809 (1.999) 88.410 (0.993) 85.239 (1.041)
Overall 78.321 (0.945) 89.807 (1.238) 88.957 (0.578) 85.695 (0.645)
Values represent percentages. Values in Parentheses are standard errors.
TABLE 2 | Summary of ToM performance by group and gender (Study 1).
Factual Inference 1st-Order 2nd-Order Overall
Non-Dyslexic Female 8.857 (0.188) 7.971 (0.225) 7.714 (0.256) 7.314 (0.254) 7.964 (0.162)
Non-Dyslexic Male 8.762 (0.243) 7.667 (0.291) 8.667 (0.331) 7.476 (0.327) 8.143 (0.209)
Dyslexic Female 8.636 (0.237) 6.682 (0.284) 6.591 (0.323) 6.227 (0.320) 7.034 (0.204)
Dyslexic Male 8.273 (0.336) 6.455 (0.402) 6.727 (0.457) 6.455 (0.452) 6.977 (0.288)
Non-Dyslexic 8.810 (0.154) 7.819 (0.184) 8.190 (0.209) 7.395 (0.207) 8.054 (0.132)
Dyslexic 8.455 (0.206) 6.568 (0.246) 6.659 (0.280) 6.341 (0.277) 7.006 (0.177)
Female 8.747 (0.151) 7.327 (0.181) 7.153 (0.206) 6.771 (0.204) 7.499 (0.130)
Male 8.517 (0.207) 7.061 (0.248) 7.697 (0.282) 6.965 (0.279) 7.560 (0.178)
Overall 8.632 (0.128) 7.194 (0.154) 7.425 (0.175) 6.868 (0.173) 7.530 (0.110)
Maximum possible value is 10. Values in Parentheses are standard errors.
Both the respective situations need to be held in memory whilst
the reasoner decides which of them is required to answer the
various questions on the task (Kaland et al., 2005; McKinnon and
Moscovitch, 2007).
We additionally need the ability to move mentally between,
and to appropriately suppress, either one of these two differing
subjective perceptions/representations. For first-order ToM this
is one representation on behalf of the protagonist and the other
representation being of the reasoner him/herself (Leslie et al.,
2004; Russell et al., 2006; Sabbagh et al., 2006; Lallier et al.,
2009; Lillard and Kavanaugh, 2014). Perhaps most importantly,
the appreciation of the narrative of the task and the ability to
explain what is happening requires a well-developed linguistic
competence, such as regarding an adequate vocabulary, for
syntax or for sentence-complements (Simmons and Singleton,
2000; Miller, 2001; Ransby and Swanson, 2003; Slade and
Ruffman, 2005; Moran, 2013; Cardillo et al., 2018). So, cognitive
domains such as memory, attention or in particular language
seem integral to ToM. However, as outlined earlier, such
relationships may stem more from the nature of tasks we tend to
use (false-belief performance measurements), rather than being
genuine differences in ToM between the two groups (Bloom and
German, 2000; Milligan et al., 2007; Guajardo and Cartwright,
2016).
For our alternative measure of ToM, we turned to a
questionnaire index instead of the more experimental-task-based
index such as the false-belief task used in study 1. Questionnaires
have occasionally been said to be relatively unsuited for
assessing ToM (Realo et al., 2003). However, here, instead
of the questionnaire testing ToM directly using a score (e.g.,
Rutherford, 2004), we asked participants about their behaviours,
feelings and dispositions towards/about themselves and other
people in quite everyday situations (Chinn and Crossmann,
1995; Hales, 1995; Griffiths, 2007; Abd Ghani and Gathercole,
2013; Dodell-Feder et al., 2013). In this way, we could assess
participants ToM without the need for the assessment to be
confounded with memory, attention and language competencies.
As this new questionnaire tool comprised 30 questions, we
termed it the ToM30Q.
To assist consideration of whether the ToM30Q was valid,
we considered three separate partial-validations. The first of
these was against an existing written tool for indexing ToM.
One of the most noted is Rutherford’s (2004) ToM stories task
using embedded false-belief. This task centres on stories typically
involving four characters who have false beliefs about what one of
the other characters believes. After reading a story, the participant
considers a number of statements, each using the two-alternative
forced choice response format. The participant then has to select
the correct belief or factual statement from the two options. Both
types of questions could ask about first-order ToM or higher
order ToM, with analogous questions asked about the facts of
the stories.
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The Rutherford task is given in written form but it assesses
ToM in a way said to be similar to the more standard false-belief
task used with children (Rutherford, 2004). We expected that, if
the Rutherford task is assessing the same ToM construct as our
ToM30Q, we should find that a ToM factor we extract from our
ToM30Qwould be correlated with the Rutherford task. However,
if measuring different things (e.g., ToM independent of language
vs. ToM affected by language, respectively), then we would have
expected such a correlation to be absent.
The second partial validation of the ToM30Q was based
around the relationship between ToM and empathy (Christov-
Moore et al., 2014). Decety et al. (2010) define empathy as the
ability to share a wide range of emotions and feelings of others
but without this stemming from direct emotional stimulation.
Basically, it is the abilitymetaphorically to put oneself in someone
else’s shoes. This ability to imagine how someone else feels, is
not the same as the ability to entertain a false belief, but the two
competencies are generally taken to be quite closely associated
(Blair, 2005; Singer, 2006).
This means that we should be able to partially validate
our ToM30Q against an existing measure of empathy. The
questionnaire used here was the Empathy Components
Questionnaire (ECQ—Batchelder et al., 2017).
The third way of partially validating the ToM30Q was to
consider whether it results in differences between certain groups
of participants. For example, gender differences in ToM are quite
slight during middle childhood, with the advantage tending to be
for girls (Charman et al., 2002;Walker, 2005; Gardner et al., 2012;
Meneghetti et al., 2012). The female advantage appears more
substantial in adolescence and adulthood (Ahmed and Miller,
2011; Gardner et al., 2012; Meneghetti et al., 2012; Ibanez et al.,
2013; Wacker et al., 2017), although there are some exceptions
(Russell et al., 2006; Dodell-Feder et al., 2013).
Empathy, which has been previously associated to ToM, also
shows up gender effects in favour of females from around 6 years
of age, with the gap widening with age as for ToM (Chapman
et al., 2006; Lam and Yeung, 2012).
Method for Study 2
Participants
Participants were 93 adults studying or working at a UK
university. They were assigned to one of two groups based on
whether they reported previously being diagnosed as having
dyslexia, in the same way as for study 1 earlier. The group having
dyslexia comprised 25 participants of mean age 22.798 years
(SD = 2.488, 15 females). The non-dyslexic group comprised 67
participants of mean age 24.744 years (SD = 5.896, 50 females).
None of the participants had taken part in study 1.
Materials
These were the ToM30Q, the Rutherford stories task, and the
Empathy Components Questionnaire. The ToM30Q contained
a total of 30 questions with 24 of these intended to assess a
number of hypothesised aspects of ToM but without the need
for a more formal experimental test. The remaining 6 questions
were intended to be control questions but were worded in a way
similar to that of the ToM questions. An example is Q4—“If
you are talking to someone who has tattoos, does this take your
attention away fromwhat they are saying?”. ToM questions asked
about the extent to which the participant routinely considers
other people’s beliefs, reflects on their own past beliefs, tends to be
able to read what someone is thinking based on looking at their
eyes or interpreting the tone of their voice, are actually interested
in what people are thinking, are easily distracted away from
social interactions with other people, and consider it important to
share one’s beliefs with other people. An example is Q16—“When
someone does something do you try to imagine what they were
thinking that made them do it?”. Other questions asked about
a participant’s interest in recognising other people’s emotional
states, the participant’s own emotionality, whether the participant
feels they are better or not as good as their peers at telling when
someone is getting upset in different circumstances, and how
much they are troubled by a friend who is upset. An example is
Q13—“In a face to face conversation with friends, I am one of
the last to tell when someone’s mood is changing” (Maszk et al.,
1999).
The questionnaire both included positively worded and
negatively worded questions, with the latter being reverse coded
before scoring. For each question, the participant selected one
of five possible responses on a Likert-type scale accompanied by
semantic differentiated descriptions (Always . . . Never—similar
to Duval et al., 2011). The full questionnaire is available upon
reasonable request.
Factor Analysis was carried out after removing the six control
questions. The remaining 24 questions were used to establish
whether the data were consistent with one or more factors which
could be identified as ToM. This analysis used the Principal
Componentsmethod. Pre PCA checks demonstrated thismethod
was appropriate. Skew and kurtosis were within +/−2.0 and
+/−3.0, respectively. Also, inspection of the correlation matrix
did not suggest any multi-collinearity.
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling was 0.668 (i.e.,
above 0.6, Kaiser, 1974; Kaiser and Rice, 1974). Bartlett’s test
of sphericity was statistically-significant (p < 0.001), indicating
the overall profile of correlations in the matrix differed from
0. Lastly here, communalities between items were above 0.40
(Jolliffe, 2002; Field, 2013).
PCA with orthogonal varimax factor rotation initially
produced eight factors, with eigenvalues exceeding a Kaiser’s
criterion of 1, explaining 44.205% of the total variance. Of these
eight factors, the last four contained two items or fewer. We then
reran the analysis, forcing the number of factors to four, as only
the first four factors had contained three or more items. This
forced-factor reduction resulted in all but one of the 24 items
(Q20) loading adequately onto one of the four forced factors.
Note, factor analysis was run completely independently
by both investigators; yet both followed the same
procedure for factor reduction and arrived at precisely
the same factor structure. Additional confidence in the
analysis was further boosted by preliminary analysis
of a completely separate dataset based on around 400
participants but not concerning dyslexia (paper in
preparation). Thus, we consider the analysis robust enough
to continue.
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A summary of the four factors and the rotated component
matrix is given in Appendix 3. Factor 1 contained eight items,
factor 2 contained seven items, factor 3 contained four items
and factor 4 contained four items. The two investigators and two
research assistants separately reviewed each of the four factors,
in order to arrive at a consensus as to the most informative label
to give each one. We tried to give a label to each, that accepted
at least three of the four suggested labels, with any differences
in offered labels resolved by discussion. The result of this process
was that the first two factors closely related to ToM, with the other
two factors more tentatively related to ToM.
The consensus label for factor 1 was “Perception-based-ToM.”
This label was intended to capture the tendency for this factor to
involve an interest in ToM via direct perception of eyes, voice
or emotion (self-perception). This accepted prior links between
ToM and emotion, as discussed by Harris (e.g., Harris, 1989; see
also Hynes et al., 2006).
We called Factor 2 “mental-representational-ToM,” drawing
on a phrase introduced by Perner (1991). This was largely
because, irrespective of whether the emotion or the past beliefs
of others were under consideration, the labels offered indicated
mental representation of own and other’s ToM or of own present
vs. own past ToM (Coricelli, 2005). Thus, this factor reduces to a
person being routinely sensitive to or interested in setting up dual
representations of minds; as theoretically required, for example,
by false-belief tasks (cf. Wimmer and Perner, 1983).
Factor 3, the first of the less direct indexes of ToM, was called
“prioritising-the-face.” This factor seemed to revolve around an
interest in being physically in the vicinity of the other person,
whose subjective belief or emotional state is then interpreted by
looking at the face (Harris, 1989). We called factor 4 “interest-
in-others.” This factor was about how affected a person considers
him/herself to be by others and, or the extent to which they find
it easier to read others’ beliefs if the participant already had direct
experience of what the other might now be going through.
Cronbach’s alpha reliability analyses were applied to the four
factors. Factor 1 (perception-based-ToM) had a Cronbach’s alpha
value of 0.763 and this value did not increase if any one of its 8
items was excluded. For factor 2 (mental-representational-ToM),
Cronbach’s alpha was estimated in the same way and was 0.748,
based on all 7 of its items.
For factor 3 (prioritising-the-face) we observed a Cronbach’s
alpha estimate of 0.626, which we considered adequate. Although
the reliability estimate for factor 4 (interest-in-others) was a more
moderate 0.421, we included this factor in our following analyses.
The next questionnaire was the Empathy Components
Questionnaire (ECQ—Batchelder et al., 2017). This had 27 items
intended to assess empathy towards other people. A factor
analysis was conducted using the same procedure as for the
ToM30Q. This revealed a single factor, containing 19 of the 27
items. The remaining items had low factor loadings and three or
fewer items. A summary of the items loading on Factor 1 plus the
items that were not robust enough to form additional factors in
our particular dataset, is given in Appendix 4. Cronbach’s Alpha
analysis for the ECQ resulted in a reliability estimate of 0.895.
We considered this again sufficient for us to proceed to data
analyses proper.
The third of our tools was the Rutherford stories task. For
reasons of time, we used only one of the four stories reported
by Rutherford (2004). This was the story about chocolates. This
task contained a story which the participant read, plus a series
of nine questions. Four of the questions were control questions,
and the remaining five questions were about subjective beliefs
that the characters in the story held about the location of the
chocolates, or the beliefs of other characters about its location.
Each question was binary in form. Additionally, the ToM and
control questions had highly differing difficulties by design and
were converted to weighted and unweighted scores (Rutherford,
2004), rendering one or both measures non-linear. We estimated
reliability based on the more linear coding of 1 point per
item. We used Cronbach’s Alpha and estimated the significance
level via the Freedman-Chi-Square method. Computed in this
way, the estimate for the present sample was 0.561, which we
considered moderate.
Design
The design included comparisons of means on the ToM30Q
according to gender, and correlations between the factors of the
ToM30Q and the published index of empathy (ECQ) and ToM
(Rutherford stories task). These were preceded by a preliminary
analysis of the Rutherford task in terms of comparison of
group means, so that we could determine if scores on this task
resembled either the false-belief task profile in study 1 or more
closely resembled the profile of the ToM30Q in study 2.
Procedure
Participants were tested in a laboratory setting, as before. They
first answered a number of demographic questions, most notedly
their birth sex and current gender identity. In all cases the
responses of these two indexes were identical. Participants were
also asked about their previous grades at GCSE level, in English,
Maths, Science and Information Technology (IT). The subject
having answers from virtually all participants was Science and
so this subject was used to assess any academic performance
differences according to group.
After the demographic questionnaire, participants completed
the Rutherford stories task, the ECQ and the ToM30Q. For the
ToM30Q the questions were read by the researcher to keep issues
of participants’ reading speed or accuracy to a minimum. For the
ECQ, the same procedure was used. However, for the Rutherford
task, each participant was first given 2min to read through the
story, and then the control and ToM questions were asked by
the researcher as per the above questionnaires. For this tool, the
participants were permitted to re-read the story as they saw fit,
if this was needed to help them answer a particular question.
The ToM questions were a composite of first-order and higher
order questions, permitting the calculation of a raw score plus a
weighted score as reported in Rutherford (2004). Altogether, this
procedure took around 45min per participant, including briefing
and debriefing.
Results and Discussion for Study 2
For the ToM30Q we calculated the average scores out of a
maximum of 5, across the items of the ToM factor and also for
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the Emotionality factor. We did similarly for the ECQ. For the
Rutherford stories task we summed the correct answers out of
5 for ToM and out of 4 for the control (non-ToM) questions.
We additionally calculated the weighted scores as in Rutherford
(2004).
Study 1 already showed that the self-reporting and university
student support service identification of dyslexia as a diagnosis is
in line with reading, spelling andWM scores. Also, in educational
settings dyslexia is typically considered to be a learning disability,
rather than only concerning reading difficulties (Selikowitz,
1998; Ransby and Swanson, 2003; Jeffries and Everatt, 2004;
Cardillo et al., 2018). This is partly because less accurate reading,
slower reading speeds or slower comprehension of what is read,
can impact on learning even where the ability to read is not
the primary concern of the subject (e.g., in teaching/learning
mathematics—Chinn et al., 2001). Therefore, for the present
study, we took a further step to look at real-life performance
impacts of having dyslexia.
The first analysis here therefore considered whether the
dyslexic group and non-dyslexic group showed the expected
difference on GCSE science (averaged multiple/combined
awards). The data were translated as follows. For the GCSE grades
we scored in even numbers from A∗ (12 points) through to grade
F or lower (0 points). For example, a grade C would have a
score of 6. All 25 of the group having dyslexia were entered into
this analysis. However, for the non-dyslexic group, 1 of the 68
participants did not give GCSE data and so this participant’s data
are excluded from this initial analysis.
The mean GCSE score for the group having dyslexia was
7.920 (SD = 1.681), and for the non-dyslexic group the mean
was 8.720 (SD = 1.665). In relative percentage terms, the non-
dyslexic group tended to have translated science scores around
10% higher relative to the group having dyslexia. This difference
is in line with the overall difference found in study 1, for reading,
spelling and WM. The difference here, corresponds to just under
one grade point (roughly C+ vs. B+).
A One-way Between Subjects Analysis of Variance was
carried out with GCSE_Science as the dependent variable.
The independent variable was dyslexia-status as in study 1.
The difference between the two groups on science scores was
statistically-significant [F(1, 90) = 4.166, p = 0.044, Partial Eta
2
= 0.044, Obs.Power= 0.524].
The group having dyslexia tending to have lower scores in
GCSE Science (slightly less than one grade lower), is in line
with research that has shown that overall, having dyslexia can
impact on indexes related to academic performance (Griffiths,
2007; Abd Ghani and Gathercole, 2013; Reis et al., 2020). Thus,
this first finding seems in line with the self-categorisation of the
two groups as having vs. not having dyslexia.
Before turning to the ToM questionnaire data, it was
considered prudent to determine whether the Rutherford stories
task of ToM, distinguished between our two groups. If we are
correct in our assumption that ToM tasks based around false-
belief can be distorted because of their reliance on cognitive
structures such as memory and language (Bloom and German,
2000), then we should find the Rutherford task intimates a ToM
deficit related to dyslexia that is similar to what we found in study
TABLE 3 | Summary of main effects on the 6 variables from the Rutherford task.
Control Theory of Mind Total
Unweighted
Non-Dyslexic 3.309 (0.090) 4.500 (0.099) 7.809 (0.157)
Dyslexic 2.560 (0.149) 3.800 (0.164) 6.360 (0.259)
Overall 2.934 (0.087) 4.150 (0.096) 7.084 (0.151)
Weighted
Non-Dyslexic 5.882 (0.259) 11.500 (0.298) 17.382 (0.432)
Dyslexic 4.280 (0.427) 9.200 (0.492) 13.480 (0.712)
Overall 5.081 (0.249) 10.350 (0.288) 15.431 (0.416)
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
1. To robustly address this question, the means for each group
for control and ToM scores were calculated. These means are
presented in Table 3, with the unweighted scores in the top half
of the table and the weighted scores in the bottom half.
Table 3 suggests that regardless of whether we used the
weighted or unweighted scores or whether we took the ToM
scores, the non-ToM control scores or the total score on the
Rutherford task, we saw essentially the same pattern. That is to
say, the Rutherford task, just like the computer-based false-belief
task of study 1, suggests a consistent tendency for participants not
having dyslexia to score higher.
These data were analysed using a Multivariate Analysis
of Variance (MANOVA) with dyslexia status as the between-
subjects factor and the six sets of scores (2 weighting calculation
modes × 3 indexes from each) as the multivariate dependent
variable. The multivariate main effect of group combined across
all six measures shown in Table 3, was found to be statistically-
significant [Wilks’ Lambda F(4, 88) = 7.871, p< 0.001, Partial Eta
2
= 0.264, Obs.Power= 0.997].
The separate analyses run for each of the six dependent
variables as part of theMANOVA for the Rutherford task showed
that the difference between our two groups was statistically-
significant in every case [each F(1, 91) > 13.362, p < 0.001, Partial
Eta2 > 0.128, Obs.Power > 0.951]. These differences were also
significant for each of the weighted Rutherford scores [each
F(1,91) > 15.970, p < 0.001, Partial Eta
2
> 0.149, Obs.Power >
0.975]. Thus, whether we considered the Rutherford scores for
ToM, the scores on the control questions or even both of these
combined into a total score, we obtained essentially the same
finding: If we were to take test scores as our preferred index of
ToM, we might well-interpret these findings as confirming that
dyslexia is linked to lower ToM performance. The key findings
about dyslexia in study 1 then, are unlikely to have arisen because
of our use of a computer task of false-belief ToM.
So, we have confirmed that the group-wise comparison of
GCSE Science scores is in line with the dyslexic vs. the non-
dyslexic groups’ self-reported dyslexia status, and that according
to the Rutherford task there would seem to be a deficit in
ToM connected to having dyslexia. However, recall our main
thesis is that a relationship of language measures to ToM does
not necessarily have to have arisen because language is integral
to ToM. Equally, such a data profile could arise if linguistic
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performance measures make it harder for a participant group to
report its true ToM competence. Our ToM questionnaire index
of ToM does not rely on participants having to memorise fairly
substantial amounts of material and does not call for mastery of
particular syntactic propositional structures through which ToM
reasoning must pass (Miller, 2001; de Villiers and Pyers, 2002;
Milligan et al., 2007). Therefore, if one wishes to fully confirm
whether the computer-based false-belief task of study 1 and the
Rutherford stories task, which do agree with one another, are
revealing a reality of having dyslexia, it is important to assess
ToM in a way not so reliant on language/memory. This is what
our ToM questionnaire is intended to address.
Turning to the three planned partial validations of the
ToM30Q. A set of Pearson’s correlations was run in order to
determine the strength of association between the four factors
(from the ToM30Q) against each of the other main variables
(Rutherford stories task, ECQ Empathy, Gender). Recall from
the factor analysis of this tool, the factors were labelled F1
= Perception-based-ToM; F2 = Mental-representational-ToM;
F3 = Prioritising-the-face; and F4 = Sensitivity-to-others. This
correlational analysis included all four factors of the ToM30Q so
that we could assess whether the factors of the ToM30Q were
correlated with each other. This analysis was run first with all
participants included and then with only the non-dyslexic group.
The results were no different in terms of statistical significance.
We therefore present only the analysis with all participants
included. The pairwise correlations are summarised in Table 4.
Table 4 shows that the 4 ToM factors from the ToM30Q were
significantly correlated with our measure of empathy (the ECQ).
Empathy has generally been taken to form part of the basis of
ToM (Dodell-Feder et al., 2013), and so the present finding of a
strong association was as anticipated.
There was also a statistically-significant association between
gender and the first three factors of the ToM30Q. That
correlation was negative, indicating that the gender that had
been coded as 1 (i.e., females) tended to have higher factor
4 scores than the gender coded as 2 (i.e., males), although
it approached but did not reach statistical significance. These
significant associations are again in line with findings from
previous studies as regards gender and ToM in children and
adults (Walker, 2005).
However, things seemed somewhat less clear for our third
partial validation which was against the Rutherford stories task,
intended to test for the actual application of ToM reasoning
via a direct ToM score. The Rutherford ToM task was not
reliably correlated with factor 1 (perception-based-ToM), factor
2 (mental-representational-ToM), nor with factor 4 (sensitivity-
towards-others). However, Rutherford ToM score was correlated
with factor 3 (prioritising-the-face).
Rutherford ToM was not correlated with overall empathy (via
the ECQ) or with gender. This latter finding suggests that, on
this occasion, the Rutherford task may not have been as good a
measure of ToM as we had hoped; possibly due to us relying on
only one of its stories.
That said, the finding that the Rutherford stories task was
correlated with Factor 3 of the ToM30Q (prioritising-the-face),
suggests that in our sample, the Rutherford story we selected
was more sensitive to thinking about the facial expressions likely
exhibited by the four protagonists in the story than to their
hypothesised mental states.
To test the robustness of the Rutherford task and the ToM30Q
as predictors of our independent index of empathy (ECQ) in the
context of each other, a linear regression was carried out. This
used the step-wise method in order to establish the variables most
critical to predicting empathy score. We selected the backward
stepping method to allow us to see how the variables are removed
from the initial model (the simultaneous entrymodel) to settle on
those variables contained in the most stable model.
This analysis produced five models, with the Rutherford ToM
index the first to be removed (step 2). The final model had
a multiple correlation coefficient of 0.763 [F(3, 89) = 41.299, p
< 0.001]; and accounted for 58.2% of the variability in the
empathy index (R2 = 0.582). Table 5 shows that our final model
contained the first three factors from the ToM30Q. This is further
confirmation that the ToM30Q indexes phenomena that are
related to empathy.
We can now turn to the important issue of whether the
ToM30Q gives findings on dyslexia that bolster the findings from
study 1 and the Rutherford task of study 2, regarding differential
ToM as a function of having dyslexia. Table 6 summarises mean
scores for the factors of the ToM30Q, according to gender
and dyslexia status. The trends summarised in the table were
analysed using a three-way mixed-model ANOVA with ToM30Q
score as the dependent variable. The within-subjects factor was
ToM30Q component, with four levels corresponding to our four
factors from the ToM30Q. The two between-subjects factors were
dyslexia status (dyslexia vs. non-dyslexia) and gender (females
vs. males).
Table 6 suggests scores tended to differ according to ToM30Q
factor (Duval et al., 2011). The overall difference was statistically-




Table 6 additionally reconfirmed the tendency for females to
have higher scores on the ToM30Q than did males (see also
earlier r value for gender in Table 4), with this difference again




However, the very slender difference between dyslexic and
non-dyslexic group was not statistically-significant [F(1, 89) =
1.944, p = 0.167, Partial Eta2 = 0.021, Obs.Power = 0.281].
None of the two-way or three-way interactions were statistically-
significant [Gender × ToM category—F(3, 267) = 1.071, p =
0.362, Partial Eta2 = 0.012, Obs.Power = 0.289; Gender ×
Dyslexia Status—F(1, 89) = 1.494, p= 0.225, Partial Eta
2
= 0.017,
Obs.Power= 0.227; Dyslexia Status× ToM Category—F(1, 89) <
1; Gender× Dyslexia Status× ToM Category—F(3, 267) = 1.616,
p= 0.186, Partial Eta2 = 0.018, Obs.Power= 0.423].
This analysis reconfirmed the gender association with the
ToM factor in the above correlational analyses, as well as being in
line with the oft-reported finding of higher ToM in girls beyond
childhood (Ahmed andMiller, 2011; Gardner et al., 2012;Wacker
et al., 2017). However, importantly and in stark contrast to our
Rutherford task and our computer-based false-belief tasks (study
1), the ToM30Q (present study) did not support the contention
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TABLE 4 | Correlations between ECQ, Rutherford ToM, and ToM30Q four factors.
Empathy Ruth ToM F1 F2 F3 F4 Gender Ruth CTRL
Empathy – 0.056 (0.296) 0.573 (<0.001) 0.561 (<0.001) 0.506 (<0.001) 0.223 (0.016) −0.390 (<0.001) 0.051 (0.313)
Ruth ToM – −0.143 (0.085) −0.032 (0.380) 0.330 (0.001) −0.024 (0.410) −0.111 (0.144) 0.458 (<0.001)
F1 – 0.378 (<0.001) 0.152 (0.073) 0.165 (0.057) −0.192 (0.033) −0.020 (0.425)
F2 – 0.294 (0.002) 0.196 (0.030) −0.343 (<0.001) −0.035 (0.369)
F3 – 0.237 (0.011) −0.314 (0.001) 0.203 (0.025)
F4 – −0.095 (0.183) −0.251 (0.008)
Gender – −0.154 (0.070)
Ruth CTRL –
ToM, Theory of Mind. F1–F4 are factors from the ToM30Q. F1, Perceptual-based-ToM; F2, Mental-representational-ToM; F3, Prioritising-the-face; F4, Sensitivity to others; Ruth,
Rutherford stories task; CTRL, control questions. Values in parentheses are significance levels for each respective pairwise correlation.
TABLE 5 | Summary of final model (5) of stepwise regression onto ECQ.
Variable name Unstandardized beta Standardised beta Partials t p-Value
F1 0.391 0.404 0.501 5.457 <0.001
F2 0.279 0.304 0.388 3.969 <0.001
F3 0.328 0.355 0.464 4.941 <0.001
F1, Perceptual-based-ToM; F2, Mental-representational-ToM; F3, Prioritising-the-face; F4, Sensitivity to others; ECQ, Empathy Components Questionnaire. Variables excluded from
this model were Rutherford ToM, Rutherford control questions, Gender, and F4 from the ToMQ30. Only F1–F3 of the ToM30Q predicted empathy (DV = ECQ).
that there exist differences in ToM according to dyslexia, neither
on its own as a main effect nor in interaction with one or both
of the other independent variables analysed here (Gender and
ToM category).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We found in study 1, that dyslexic participants performed less
well on false-belief ToM questions; and that this finding was
replicated with a different false-belief task (Rutherford stories
task) in study 2. However, with the new ToM30Q we introduced
as the main focus of study 2, we greatly reduced the reliance in
particular onmemory and language for working out test answers.
Our findings now showed that persons having dyslexia do not in
fact have any deficit at all in ToM. Below we consider these and
our other findings in terms of lessons from dyslexia to ToM.
In our first study we found that the participant group
previously diagnosed as having dyslexia scored lower on a
false-belief task than did a non-dyslexic group. Similar findings
have been reported for other neurological impairments (e.g.,
Tompkins et al., 2008; Sandoz et al., 2014; Ho et al., 2018; Bailey
and Im-Bolter, 2020). However, this is one of the first such
findings regarding ToM in adults having dyslexia.
Moran (2013) raised the possibility that ToM may function
quite independently from general cognition in adults. This meant
it may be possible to assess ToM whilst limiting the influence
of cognitive factors known to be an issue in certain groups
such as persons having dyslexia. We used this approach in
study 2, in order to arrive at a new measure for ToM that was
more spontaneous than in study 1. We largely avoided the need
to test participants directly and relied as little as practicable
on cognitive abilities such as language and memory in the
ToM reasoning process. This allowed us to assess ToM as it is
subjectively reflected or applied in the individual’s actual real-
life experiences. This pursuit was in line with the observation
from many theorists, which is that ToM in real life settings may
be effortless, automatic and rarely needing to become verbally
explicated (Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; Burman, 2008; Mills
and Fox, 2016).
From the ToM30Q data in study 2, we extracted four factors,
two of which could be termed ToM. These two ToM factors,
perception-based-ToM (factor 1) and mental-representational-
ToM (factor 2) exhibited lower ToM30Q scores than the
remaining two factors which seemed to be more about attitudes
to minds more than to the importance of reading minds (see
Perner, 1991 for first distinctions of this kind).
Of these two further factors, prioritising-the-face (factor 3)
seemed to be about being more interested in mental states if the
mental states to be appreciated, can be partly gleaned by looking
at a person’s face. Note, the distinction between this factor and
factor 1, is that factor 1 uses one’s own emotions to assist the
discerning of others mental states, unlike factor 3 which seems
to require direct perception of the face itself (i.e., a perceptual
cue—Wright and Dowker, 2002).
The final factor of sensitivity-towards-others (factor 4),
seemed to be about being comfortable with the need to read
minds during social interaction. Thus, this factor was not so
much about ToM, as it was about sensitivity to the need or the
potential advantages of mindreading to social interaction.
Our two ToM factors bear some resemblance to a category of
ToM quite recently termed cognitive ToM; and our remaining
two factors seem to resemble a second proposed category termed
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TABLE 6 | Summary of ToM30Q factors by gender and Dyslexia Status.
F1 F2 F3 F4 Overall
Non-Dyslexic Female 3.106 (0.079) 3.295 (0.081) 3.650 (0.080) 3.417 (0.084) 3.367 (0.051)
Non-Dyslexic Male 2.870 (0.110) 2.919 (0.113) 3.359 (0.111) 3.467 (0.118) 3.154 (0.071)
Dyslexic Female 2.858 (0.136) 3.286 (0.140) 3.550 (0.138) 3.717 (0.146) 3.353 (0.088)
Dyslexic Male 2.738 (0.167) 2.814 (0.171) 3.025 (0.169) 3.175 (0.178) 2.938 (0.108)
Non-Dyslexic 2.988 (0.068) 3.107 (0.069) 3.504 (0.068) 3.442 (0.072) 3.344 (0.045)
Dyslexic 2.798 (0.108) 3.050 (0.111) 3.288 (0.109) 3.446 (0.115) 3.251 (0.070)
Female 2.982 (0.079) 3.290 (0.081) 3.600 (0.080) 3.567 (0.084) 3.360 (0.044)
Male 2.804 (0.100) 2.867 (0.103) 3.192 (0.101) 3.321 (0.107) 3.145 (0.070)
Overall 2.893 (0.064) 3.079 (0.065) 3.396 (0.064) 3.444 (0.068) 3.203 (0.041)
ToM, Theory of Mind. F1–F4 are factors from the ToM30Q. F1, Perceptual-based-ToM; F2, Mental-representational-ToM; F3, Prioritising-the-face; F4, Sensitivity to others. Values in
parentheses are standard errors.
effective ToM (Brothers and Ring, 1992). In our study 2,
individuals were found to score lower on the ToM factors (factors
1 & 2) than on the attitudinal factors (factors 3 & 4). This finding
seems to imply that thinking in terms of mental states is in
some sense more demanding than responding to other people’s in
terms of positive/negative effect (Maszk et al., 1999; Duval et al.,
2011).
The ToM30Q revealed the expected effects regarding
correlations with empathy (Blair, 2005; Chapman et al., 2006;
Singer, 2006; Lam and Yeung, 2012; Christov-Moore et al.,
2014). Unlike in study 1, we observed the expected relationship
to gender (Ahmed and Miller, 2011; Gardner et al., 2012;
Meneghetti et al., 2012; Ibanez et al., 2013; Wacker et al.,
2017). Also as anticipated, we observed a difference in profile
between the ToM30Q and a second task that measured false-
belief (Rutherford, 2004). The ToM30Q also showed some
degree of independence between the four factors we extracted
(Moran, 2013). Despite the relative success of our multiple partial
validations, the ToM30Q revealed absolutely no evidence of
any difference between persons having dyslexia vs. those not
having dyslexia. This null result occurred both for the ToM
factor and the emotionality factor. The contrast between the
false-belief tasks and our ToM30Q can be seen most clearly in
Figure 1. This shows no difference in ToM on the ToM30Q but
a relatively robust difference on both false-belief tasks (one used
with each sample).
Our findings from the ToM30Q are in line with findings from
a group of African-American children assessed via a composite
of three measures of ToM, which included false-belief. There
were no differences between the ToM of children of low vs.
high socio-economic class, there was no suggestion of differences
compared to studies of the majority ethnic group (e.g., middle
classWhite children), and no indication that basic linguistic skills
(e.g., dialect differences, vocabulary differences) were associated
to ToM (Longobardi et al., 2016).
The present findings are also in line with recent research
concerning ADHD, which is often said to be strongly associated
with dyslexia (Abdel-Hamid et al., 2019). So, we are in
the position where we would have reported an apparent-
dyslexia disadvantage when we use a false-belief task of ToM
(computer-based false-belief task and also Rutherford stories
task). However, we find not even a hint of a dyslexia disadvantage
when we assess ToM in a way that greatly reduces reliance on
language; despite the performance on cognitive and performance
tests supporting the greater difficulties our dyslexic groups are
expected to have (Moran, 2013). What this says to us is that lower
performance on a false-belief ToM task does not necessarily
prove lower understanding of others’ minds (Bloom andGerman,
2000; Sandoz et al., 2014).
We draw on two additional studies in support of our view.
First, McKinnon and Moscovitch (2007) found that older adults
did worse on a ToM task and also on a non-ToM task, as
compared to younger adults. But rather than concluding that
we lose the ability to understand beliefs, intentions etc. as we
mature in age, McKinnon and Moscovitch accepted the far more
reasonable conclusion that computational processes that happen
to be called on as part of ToM reasoning, and not necessarily
ToM understanding itself, are what decline in older adults
(e.g., manipulating symbolic representations in WM). Second,
Marschark et al. (2000) found that when a narrative task is used
instead of a false-belief task of ToM, with ToM calculated by
scoring the spontaneous use of mental state attributions from
the recordings, deaf children (often considered to have a ToM
deficit when false-belief tasks are used—e.g., Russell et al., 1998),
now do not show any ToM deficit at all, as compared to hearing
children matched for age (see also Courtin, 2000; Meristo et al.,
2007; Bailey and Im-Bolter, 2020).
As confirmed by taking our two studies together, it is possible
to infer reasons why certain groups might appear to have a
ToM deficit, when in fact they do not have any such deficit.
Our explanation is in line with that of Longobardi et al. (2016)
who concluded that there is a distinction between having ToM
and demonstrating it via false-belief tasks. We could liken this
difference to one of ToM competence vs. ToM performance.
It is our view that our findings with the ToM30Q, may carry
implications about the ecological validity of relying too heavily
on any one particular ToM task (e.g., the standard false-belief
task) when we are carrying out research that might have far-
reaching implications to a particular atypical group, should the
findings indicate a deficit. For example, theremay be implications
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FIGURE 1 | Summary According to Task and Dyslexia Status: There was a difference between ToM for participants having dyslexia vs. those not having dyslexia for
the computer false-belief task and the Rutherford false-belief task. However, when the total on the ToM30Q was used, this showed no difference between the two
groups. FB refers to false-belief tasks. ToM30Q includes all 4 factors.
to strategies teachers might use to educate certain child groups,
or even implications to the potential lowering of academic
expectations of those groups (Simmons and Singleton, 2000;
Jeffries and Everatt, 2004; Abd Ghani and Gathercole, 2013;
Demetrious and Spanoudis, 2018; Bailey and Im-Bolter, 2020).
Atypicalities concerned, might include deafness,
schizophrenia and potentially even autism (Gregory et al.,
2002; Meristo et al., 2007; Wolf et al., 2010; Hobson, 2014;
de Vaan et al., 2018; Németh et al., 2018; Acosta et al., 2019).
Our thesis that ToM might be assessed without the need
to actually “test” participants on false-belief tasks, does not
automatically exclude the thesis that language assists the
setting up of mental tokens for things in the external world
and hence may be related to ToM for that reason (Astington
and Jenkins, 1999; de Villiers and Pyers, 2002; Mills and Fox,
2016). Rather, it may be that language assists ToM in some
respects but is an obstacle to accurately assessing ToM in
certain contexts (Milligan et al., 2007; Guajardo and Cartwright,
2016). For example, language at the symbolic level may aid
the setting up and maintenance of mental representations
of the contents of others’ minds, and hence may help make
ToM an enduring ability of long-term social benefit, rather
than merely a transient ability. One way of conceptualising
this position is to argue that ToM may be a predictor of
complex linguistic discourse skills or a mediator between basic
language (e.g., production of mental state words or size of
vocabulary) and spontaneous use of social narrative language
(Mills and Fox, 2016; Kim, 2020). Indeed, ToM may even be
predictive of written compositions (Kim, 2020). Testing all
possible relationships was beyond the scope of the present
paper, but we do hope to provide evidence on this in the
near future.
It is also important to be aware that we are not at all
advocating the abandonment of false-belief tasks. Rather, we
are advocating the use of false-belief tasks alongside other
tasks less reliant on memorising and linguistically (symbolically)
processing multiple representations in mind. It is by using
the contrast between two rather different tasks satisfying our
criterion of language-diversity, and by using these tasks with the
same participants (i.e., in study 2) that we have been able to
establish exactly why it might seem that persons having dyslexia
may have an apparent-ToM deficit, when in fact there is no such
ToM deficit in dyslexia at all. Any apparent deficit in ToM in
dyslexia would seem due to language-related issues rather than
ToM-related issues.
Perhaps now is a good time to re-explore the possibility of
ToM deficits in several atypical groups with a more diverse set
of ToM tasks than used thus far. One atypical group difficult
to adequately assess using variants on the standard false-belief
tasks is in blindness (Roch-Levecq, 2006). It has proved highly
problematic to design a physical ToM task for this group, and
this may be why findings suggest that there may be a greater
delay in acquiring ToM for blind children than for any other
group, possibly including children having ASD (e.g., see Peterson
et al., 2000). According to Hobson (2014) there are good reasons
why this finding might in fact be correct. One example Hobson
discusses is that low birth weight can lead both to blindness and
ASD de Vaan et al. (2018). The ToM30Q, on the other hand,
would be as relevant to assessing ToM in blind participants as it is
to sighted participants; and hence it promises to more definitively
answer this question.
Indeed, the ToM30Q even raises the possibility of assessing
young children who fail the standard false-belief task, for example
by asking their main caregiver to answer the questions on the
ToM30Q on behalf of their child. This carries the further benefit
that it can be used even in the current Covid-19 climate, because
testing can be done on a pseudo face-to-face basis via platforms
such as Zoom or MS-Teams, by using only the audio channel
on such a platform, or even less directly by using platforms such
as Qualtrics.
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Finally, we acknowledge potential issues with our studies that
should be borne in mind alongside our very positive findings.
One is that we relied on slightly < 100 participants in each of
our two studies. However, many other studies have produced
meaningful findings with similar or smaller sample sizes than
here (Astington and Jenkins, 1999; Meristo et al., 2007; Mills and
Fox, 2016; Bailey and Im-Bolter, 2020). Another potential issue
is that our factor analysis of the ToM30Q in study 2 might be
considered less robust for reasons of sample size. Although this
will of course be true, we believe it might actually render our three
partial validations all the more persuasive. A third potential issue
is that the reliability estimate for study 2 was quite low compared
to in study 1. This may have been due to us needing to rely on
only one of the four stories from the Rutherford task we used as
part of study 2.
CONCLUSIONS
Dyslexia initially was found to be associated with lower ToM
performance as indexed by a computer-based and a non-
computer-based false-belief task. However, we then in some sense
controlled for language, performance issues and other cognitive
issues that could affect performance on experimental tasks but
which might not be integral to ToM itself. Our resultant task,
based around extraction of at least two ToM factors from a
30 item questionnaire about what reasoners feel is important
in their interactions with others, showed that any difference in
ToM performance between a dyslexic and non-dyslexic group
completely vanished.
All of the four factors on the ToM30Q (two relating to
cognitive ToM and two more attuned to attitude to presence
of other minds) were quite valid and reliable. For example, we
replicated previously reported profiles by gender and associations
with the ECQ questionnaire on empathy. We also found partial
validation in terms of the factor we called prioritising-the-face
(the first of the two attitudinal/effective factors—factor 3),
when the comparator for our ToM30Q was the Rutherford
stories task.
Despite our very encouraging findings regarding dyslexia in
this research, we would of course concede that ours is an initial
exploratory study. It is therefore necessary to further confirm the
utility of the ToM30Q with wider studies with other participant
groups and also a variety of socio-cognitive phenomena. We are
in the process of providing such studies. However, our present
conclusion regarding dyslexia, that experimental tasks of ToM
such as the false-belief task may tend to confound cognitive
domains such as language with the ability to think in terms
of minds itself, does seem plausible on our present findings.
Dyslexia does not involve a deficit in ToM, but over-reliance on
memory and verbal reporting and false-belief tasks may make it
seem so.
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